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INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult problems in understanding Minnesota
products liability law is the erosion of the distinction between strict
liability and negligence. The erosion of this distinction began as
early as 1980,1 and it is unclear when the relationship between negli-
gence and strict liability will be resolved conclusively by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court.
This Note will address Comment k of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts which provides an exception to strict liability
for unavoidably unsafe products, which are primarily classified as
prescription drugs. The Note will discuss the application of Com-
ment k in both strict liability and negligence claims. In addition, the
Note will dissect the different common law schemes utilized in apply-
ing Comment k. The overall purpose of this Note is to analyze and
present alternatives regarding whether and to what extent Comment
k should apply to strict liability and negligence claims in light of the
merger of these two theories in Minnesota.
1. See Steenson, Products Liability Law In Minnesota: Design Defect and Failure To
Warn Claims, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 443, 444 (1988).
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I. STRICT LIABILITY
A. History
The doctrine of strict liability had its genesis in a concurring opin-
ion by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.2 Justice Tray-
nor suggested that a manufacturer should be absolutely liable if, in
placing a product on the market, it knew that the product was to be
used without inspection, and the product had a defect that caused an
injury.3
Several policy considerations underlie the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. First, unlike the public, the manufacturer can anticipate or guard
against the recurrence of hazards.4 Second, the cost of injury may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the injured person whereas the man-
ufacturer can insure against the risk and distribute the cost among
the consuming public.5 Finally, it is in the public interest to discour-
age the marketing of defective products.6
In 1961, the members of the American Law Institute considered
whether to adopt a rule of strict liability.7 Two years later, Justice
Traynor, writing for the majority in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,8 held a manufacturer strictly liable in tort, based on his reason-
ing in the Escola decision.9 Finally, in 1965, the Restatement. (Sec-
ond) of Torts published section 402A10 setting forth the strict
liability doctrine as enunciated in Greenman. Since the adoption of
section 402A, almost all states have adopted some form of strict
liability.''
2. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
3. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
4. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
5. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
6. Id.
7. For a description of the process by which the Restatements were drafted, see
Goodrich, The Story Of The American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q 283, 287.
8. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
9. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
10. Section 402A provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of its product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
11. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 99 (5th ed. 1984).
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In 1967, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co. 12
In so doing, the court employed the general "consumer expecta-
tion" standard and held that a product is unreasonably dangerous
"[i]f the product presents any danger that would not be contem-
plated by an ordinary (user) (consumer) who uses it with the knowl-
edge common to the community as to the product's characteristics
and common use .... 13
Under this standard, the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant, re-
gardless of whether it is egregious or highly responsible. Rather, fo-
cusing solely on the condition of the product, the fact finder can find
a manufacturer liable even though the manufacturer could not rea-
sonably know of the danger inherent in its product. Although this
approach occasionally leads to a harsh result for a manufacturer who
acts reasonably, "enlarging a manufacturer's liability to those injured
by its products more adequately meets public policy demands to pro-
tect consumers from the inevitable risks of bodily harm created .by
mass production and complex marketing conditions."14
Since its inception, the distinctive feature of strict liability has been
that the plaintiff is not required to establish negligence on the part of
the manufacturer because the focus of the claim is on the condition
of the product, not the manufacturer's conduct.15 While semanti-
cally correct, the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted an ap-
proach which merges the concepts of negligence and strict liability
when addressing a design defect claim.16
12. 278 Minn. 332, 338-41, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-501 (1967).
13. MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL 2D JIG 118 (1974).
14. McCormack at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. The court added that strict liability
imposes the costs of the injury upon the maker, who can most effectively reduce or
eliminate the hazard to life or health, and absorb and pass on such costs. Id.
15. Id. But see Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Minn. 1982)
(Simonett, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion Justice Simonett states that this
distinction is not quite true:
To say the plaintiff does not have to prove negligence does not mean the
manufacturer is not in some sense at fault, only that the plaintiff does not
have to prove it. And it is not the product that is sued, but the person who
makes or markets it. At the bottom of a strict liability theory is still the
notion (certainly shared by jurors) that the manufacturer did something
wrong, and therefore, should pay.
This notion of "wrongness" surfaces when the law attempts to define
what it means by a defect. A defect is something which makes the product
"unreasonably dangerous." And something is unreasonably dangerous "if
the product is dangerous when used by an ordinary user who uses it with
knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics
and common usage." So we come full circle back to something with negli-
gence overtones. ...
Id. at 215.
16. See Steenson, supra note 1, at 501. During the 1980s, the Minnesota Supreme
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In Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,17 the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
the lack of distinction between strict liability and negligence in a de-
sign defect claim.18 The court completely rejected the "consumer
expectation" standard of strict liability in favor of a negligence "rea-
sonable care" standard which focuses on the conduct of the manu-
facturer rather than on the condition of the product.19
The Bilotta court rationalized its decision to adopt the "reasonable
care" standard in strict liability design defect cases by noting that the
"defect" in a design defect case "lies in a consciously chosen design"
in which the manufacturer "deliberately added or omitted the chal-
lenged component and has presumably made that decision after bal-
ancing a variety of factors."20 Therefore, the key element in
determining liability is the manufacturer's balancing of the product's
risk against its utility.
2 1
Court's decisions show a steady reduction of distinctions between negligence and
strict liability theories in design defect and failure to warn cases. Id.
17. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). The plaintiff suffered severe injuries while
working at a loading dock. The plaintiff had been assigned to general clean up
chores near the loading dock. Another employee was unloading a semitrailer with a
forklift at the same time. Somehow the forklift became stuck on the dock and the
ramp. While the other employees were trying to free the forklift, the forklift tipped
over and pinned the plaintiff at the neck against the warehouse doorjamb. The plain-
tiff was trapped for several minutes. Consequently, his brain was deprived of oxygen
and he suffered permanent brain damage. Id. at 620. The plaintiff sued Kelley Com-
pany, the dockboard manufacturer under both strict liability and negligence theories.
Id. at 619.
18. Id. at 622. See also Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn.
1982). In Holm, the court first recognized the lack of distinction when the court over-
ruled the "latent-patent danger" rule of strict liability, and adopted a reasonable care
standard:
a manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or
design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone ... when the
product is used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well as
an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the sur-
rounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the likelihood of
harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the pre-
caution which would be effective to avoid the harm."
Id. at 212 (quoting Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d 571,
577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 120-21 (1976)(citations omitted)).
19. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622. The court used the same standard as in Holm, and
removed any doubt that the reasonable care balancing approach should be applied in
design defect cases. Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 622.
20. Id.
21. Id. In evaluating the manufacturer's conduct, the jury could consider several
factors:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product;
(2) the availability of other and safer products to meet the same need;
(3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness;
(4) the obviousness of the danger;
(5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of the danger;
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After Bilotta, strict liability and negligence merged into one negli-
gence standard of recovery in design defect cases. 2 2 This is best ex-
emplified by the language of the jury instruction, from the Minnesota
Jury Instruction Guide, intended for design defect cases:
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care when designing a
product, so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to (anyone
who) (property that) is likely to be exposed to harm when the prod-
uct is put to its intended use or to any use that is unintended but is
reasonably foreseeable.
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the surrounding
circumstances. Reasonable care is the care that a reasonably pru-
dent person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances.
The reasonable care to be exercised by a manufacturer when de-
signing a product will depend on all facts and circumstances, in-
cluding, among others, the likelihood and seriousness of harm
against the feasibility and burden of any precautions which would
be effective to avoid the harm. You are instructed that the manu-
facturer is obligated to keep informed of scientific knowledge and
discoveries in its field.
If the manufacturer did not use reasonable care when designing
the product in question, then the product is in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous to the (user or consumer) (user's or
consumer's property). 23
The establishment of this basic standard is still evolving, and while
it may have resolved some of the problems that exist in design defect
cases, several issues remain unanswered. One issue which has been
left unanswered is the applicability of Comment k. It is that issue
which this Note will now address.
II. COMMENT K
A. History and Public Policy
In the process of considering whether to adopt strict liability in
1961, the members of the American Law Institute (ALI) pondered,
during a rather confusing discussion, whether the manufacturer of a
prescription drug should be subject to the doctrine. 2 4 One member
(6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of the product (including the
effects of instruction or warning); and
(7) the ability to eliminate the danger without seriously impairing the use-
fulness of the product or making it unduly expensive.
See Krein v. Raudabough, 406 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also Holm,
324 N.W.2d at 212 (citing Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W. LJ. 5, 17
(1965)).
22. See Steenson, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
23. MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL 3DJIG 117 (1986) [hereinafter MINN.
JIG 3D].
24. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, 90-92, 98 (1961).
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of the institute made a motion that all prescription drugs should be
exempt from strict liability on the ground that it would be "against
the public interest" to apply the doctrine to such products because of
the "very serious tendency to stifle medical research and testing."25
Dean Prosser, the reporter at that time for the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, responded with his own proposed exemption and sug-
gested that it be dealt with in the comments to the section.26 The
arguments and the discussion that followed were unfocused, and ul-
timately, both motions were defeated. 2 7
The defeat of Dean Prosser's motion, however, is not reflected in
the version of the comments he wrote that accompany section
402A.28 In particular, Comment k, which was approved by the mem-
bers of the ALI and published along with section 402A in 1965,29
contains an exception for unavoidably unsafe products. The version
of Comment k approved and published in 1965 provides as follows:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are espe-
cially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is in-
jected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified,
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they in-
volve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasona-
bly dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is
also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medi-
cal experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps
25. Id. at 98 (Harold B. Gross of New York City made the motion).
26. Id. at 96. Dean Prosser suggested that a better case could be made for ex-
cluding "relatively new, experimental, and uncertain drugs, of which there are a
great many on the market .. " Id. at 93. He then defined the term "experimental
drug" to include virtually all prescription drugs and even some over the counter
medicines. Id. at 96.
As one commentator noted, this "use of the adjective 'experimental' went far
beyond clinical testing, an initial stage of the Food and Drug Administration approval
process, and covered drugs that had completed the entire approval process and had
been marketed to consumers." Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k
and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 865 (1983). In the end, the com-
mentator indicated that Dean Prosser was suggesting an exception even broader than
the proposed motion. Id.
27. 38 A.L.I. PROC. at 98.
28. See Page, supra note 26, at 866.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justi-
fies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qual-
ification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an ap-
parently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.3 0
Although section 402A imposes strict liability on a seller who mar-
kets a product deemed to be defective and thereby unreasonably
dangerous to the consumer, Comment k provides an exception to
the strict liability rule in the case of "unavoidably unsafe" prod-
ucts.3 1 It is unclear, however, when the exception applies, and to
which drugs. Thus, one needs to focus on several key phrases and
also to understand the overall public policy of Comment k when ap-
plying the doctrine to different factual settings and legal principles.
In so doing, the first key phrase is the definition of an "unavoid-
ably unsafe" product. Comment k defines this as a product which,
"in the present state of human knowledge, [is] quite incapable of be-
ing made safe for [its] intended and ordinary use." 3 2 The second
key phrase is that Comment k is particularly applicable to the "field
of drugs," where such products are "especially common" in three
overlapping categories: (1) high-benefit, high-risk drugs, such as the
vaccine used for rabies; (2) "many other drugs, vaccines and the like,
many of which, because of high risk involved cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician"; and
(3) "many new or experimental drugs."3
3
Third, the focus must be where the comment declares that "such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."3 4 The
fourth and final key phrase states that "the seller of such products
... is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk."35
In interpreting these key phrases, it is apparent that Comment k
30. Id. at Comment k (emphasis in original).
31. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Reyes
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
33. Id.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Id. For a detailed analysis of comment k's language, see Willig, The Comment k
Character, A Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1978).
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furnishes no criteria for determining how risky and how beneficial a
drug must be in order to qualify as "unavoidably unsafe."3 6 Equally
troubling is that while Comment k emphasizes unreasonably danger-
ous, the wording suggests that the same characteristic that made the
product unreasonably dangerous might also make it defective.37
Whatever the case may be, it is these literal ambiguities that have led
to the onslaught of conflicting common law rules in interpreting and
applying Comment k.
B. Common Law
Generally, there are three varieties of product defects: manufactur-
ing flaws, design defects, and inadequate warnings.38 It is very com-
mon to plead claims of both design defect and inadequate warnings
when asserting strict liability against prescription drug manufactur-
ers. 39 Accordingly, this Note focuses on only these two claims.
Courts and commentators universally agree, however, that the
only unavoidably unsafe products by Comment k's terms which are
exempt from strict liability are those which the plaintiff alleges con-
tain a design defect, and not those which the plaintiff alleges contain
an inadequate warning.40
Some courts have taken the view that Comment k applies as a mat-
ter of law to all design defect claims involving prescription drugs.41
Others, however, have taken the view that Comment k does not pro-
vide blanket immunity to all prescription drugs; rather, the language
of Comment k applies only to "some" products.42 These two vastly
different approaches have left the application of Comment k in a
constant state of flux.
36. See generally Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ.
825, 866 (1973).
37. See generally Page, supra note 26, at 867.
38. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385
(1984)(citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 181, 463 A.2d 298, 311 (1983)).
39. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 501
(1976) [hereinafter Twerski]. Submitting a case on dual grounds of failure to warn
and design defect results from the realization that if proper warning would result in
the non-marketability of a product, then the true issue is acceptability of basic design.
40. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981);
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 128-129 (9th Cir. 1958); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Feldman,
at 384; Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 831-32, 218 Cal. Rptr.
453, 465 (1985); Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy
Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1985); Willig, supra note 35,
at 575.
41. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
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1. The Feldman, Kearl, and Toner Approach
The Feldman, Kearl, and Toner approach proposes that in a strict
products liability action based upon a design defect theory, courts
must, on a case-by-case basis, condition the application of Comment
k upon a prior showing that the drug was in fact "unavoidably dan-
gerous."43 In Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,44 the plaintiff's teeth be-
came discolored turning to a gray-brown color as a result of taking a
drug, tetracycline, produced by the defendant manufacturer.45 She
commenced a strict products liability action against the manufac-
turer. At the trial level, the jury found for the defendant. On appeal,
the jury's verdict was affirmed. The court reasoned that since pre-
scription drugs are a special category of products, drug manufactur-
ers would not be strictly liable for failure to warn of a side effect
when it was unknown at the time the product was sold.46
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, reversed and re-
manded. The court held that a manufacturer could be held strictly
liable for failing to warn of a side effect that was unknown when the
drug was sold where the manufacturer had sufficient information to
warrant a warning.47 The court also addressed the applicability of
Comment k, even though it was not addressed at trial.48 The court
recognized that the unsafe nature of certain prescription drugs may
be avoided through better manufacturing or design.49 Ultimately,
the court concluded that the determination of whether a drug is un-
avoidably unsafe should be viewed on a case-by-case basis, rather
than giving all prescription drug manufacturers a blanket immunity
from strict liability under Comment k.50 The court held that only
after considering several risk-utility factors5l and other relevant con-
siderations should a court conclude that the strict liability principle
should not be applied.52
In Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,53 the plaintiff brought a strict prod-
43. See Brown, California Speaks Out on Prescription Drug Liability, FOR THE DEFENSE,
August 1988, at 16.
44. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
45. Id. at 434, 479 A.2d at 376.
46. Id. at 435, 479 A.2d at 377.
47. Id. at 463-64, 479 A.2d at 392.
48. Id. at 441-42, 479 A.2d at 380.
49. Id. at 447, 479 A.2d at 383. The court saw "no reason to hold as a matter of
law and policy that all prescription drugs that are unsafe, are unavoidably so. Drugs,
like any other products, may contain defects that could have been avoided by better
manufacturing or design." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 444, 479 A.2d at 382. In a footnote, the court referred to the factors to
be weighed as those set forth by Professor Wade.
52. Id.
53. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
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ucts liability action against the manufacturer after contracting a dis-
ease and developing paralysis from her ingestion of an oral polio
vaccine produced by the manufacturer.54 At trial, the jury deter-
mined that the defendant's polio vaccine was defective and caused
the plaintiff to contract the disease.55
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed and re-
manded. The court held that "although in a standard products lia-
bility litigation a plaintiff may utilize a strict liability design defect
theory, such a strict liability cause of action must be prohibited for
public policy reasons if the court determines, after taking evidence,
that the product complained of is 'unavoidably dangerous.' "56
In line with Feldman, the court stated that "a drug, vaccine, or any
other product [that] triggers the unavoidably dangerous product ex-
emption [enunciated in Comment k] poses a mixed question of law
and fact and can be made only after evidence is first taken out of the
jury's presence. . . ."57 This approach calls for a "mini-trial" by each
trial judge to determine whether the particular drug in question was
"unavoidably dangerous" before Comment k would be applied.58
The Kearl court provided a three part test to be used by trial
judges when making their determination: (1) determine whether the
drug conferred an "exceptionally important benefit" that made it
"highly desirable"; (2) determine whether the risk posed by the
product was both "substantial" and "unavoidable," i.e. whether any
alternate product would have as "effectively accomplished the full in-
tended purpose" of the product; and (3) determine whether the inter-
est in the drug's availability outweighed the interest of applying strict
liability.59
In effect, the Kearl approach, similar to Feldman, mandates a case-
by-case analysis, incorporating a risk-benefit analysis to determine if
the product will be unavoidably dangerous and exempt from a strict
products liability design defect analysis.
In Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,60 the plaintiff received a vaccination
of Tri-Immunol, a drug manufactured by the defendant designed to
immunize children against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. 6 1 The
plaintiff then became paralyzed from the waist down and brought a
suit against Lederle. 62 At trial, the jury found that Lederle's vaccine
54. Id. at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 456-57.
55. Id. at 821, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 457. The plaintiff recovered $800,000. Id.
56. Id. at 817, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
58. See Brown, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
59. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 829-30, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464 (emphasis in original).
60. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987).
61. Id. at 330, 732 P.2d at 299.
62. The suit was tried to the jury on theories of strict liability, negligence, breach
of warranty and merchantability, and failure to warn. Id.
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had caused the plaintiff's paralysis, and that the defendant was negli-
gent. However, the jury also found that the vaccine was not in a "de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous to persons." 63
Lederle appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which in turn certified four questions to the Supreme
Court of Idaho. 64 These questions centered on the applicability of
the unavoidably unsafe product doctrine, as described in Comment
k, to Idaho strict liability and negligence law.65
In discussing the applicability of Comment k to strict liability
claims, the Toner court, as in Feldman and Kearl, held that courts, after
hearing evidence out of the jury's presence, must decide the applica-
bility of Comment k on a case-by-case basis.66 The court in Toner
reaffirmed the Feldman and Kearl principle that Comment k was not
intended to provide nor should provide all ethical drugs with blanket
immunity from strict liability design defect claims.67 Such a rule, the
court noted, "runs counter both to the express language of comment
k and to common sense." 68 Accordingly, the court remanded the
case back to the Idaho Court of Appeals requiring a utility-risk analy-
sis before Comment k is applied. 6 9
2. The Brown Approach
In Brown v. Superior Court,70 a unanimous California Supreme
Court rejected the Feldman, Kearl, and Toner approach and held that
Comment k applies to all prescription drugs. In Brown, approxi-
mately seventy plaintiffs filed individual lawsuits against numerous
drug manufacturers claiming they suffered injuries from using dieth-
63. Specifically, the jury found that the pertussis component of the vaccine had
caused the plaintiff's paralysis, and awarded him $1,131,200 in damages. d.
64. See Toner, 779 F.2d 1429, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986).
65. 112 Idaho at 334, 732 P.2d at 303. The certified questions were reformu-
lated to read as follows:
(1) Under Idaho law, do the principles set forth in Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) apply to strict liability claims, and in
particular to the claim in this suit? (2)(a) Under Idaho law, do the principles
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) apply
to negligence claims, and in particular to the claims of this suit?
Id.
66. Id. at 340, 732 P.2d at 309.
67. Id. at 339, 732 P.2d at 308. The court supported this conclusion through the
literal language of Comment k by noting that the comment refers only to " 'some'
products which are unavoidably unsafe .. " Further, the court remarked that "the
comment states such products are 'especially common in the field of drugs'...." Id.
(emphasis in original). The court concluded that this language in and of itself cer-
tainly "does not apply to all drugs." Id. (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 340, n.10, 732 P.2d at 309, n.10.
69. Id. at 343-44, 732 P.2d at 312-13.
70. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
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ylstilbestrol (DES), a prescription drug.71 The plaintiffs claimed that
the drug was defective and injured them in utero when their mothers
ingested it in order to prevent a miscarriage. 72 Because each of the
lawsuits raised several common issues, the actions were designated
as "complex litigation" and assigned to the HonorableJohn E. Ben-
son for resolution of various pre-trial motions.73 On appeal, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court unanimously upheld Judge Benson's rulings.
Specifically, the court held that negligence, not strict liability, gov-
erns actions involving injuries resulting from the use of prescription
drugs.74
In affirming Judge Benson's holdings, the California Supreme
Court emphatically rejected the Kearl approach. First, the court
noted that it would be unjust to allow Comment k protection exclu-
sively to drugs which have proven useful to mankind and not to
drugs which are "clearly harmful." To do so would substantially im-
pair the development and marketing of new drugs. 75 The court
noted that the harm to this interest arises in the very process of at-
tempting to make the distinction.76
Second, the court found that the Kearl approach provides a disin-
centive to drug manufacturers to develop and produce new drugs
because there is no assurance that strict liability standards would not
be applied.7 7 For example, a particular judge may feel that the drug
did not confer an "exceptionally important benefit," 7 8 that the risks
were not "substantial" and "unavoidable," or that another drug on
the market would have accomplished the same result without the
risks. Since the advantages of a drug cannot be isolated from a par-
ticular patient, the court also noted that any attempt to determine
the "superiority" of one drug over another would have to be made in
reference to a particular plaintiff and not in the abstract.7 9
71. Id. at 1055, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
72. Id. at 1054-55, 751 P.2d at 473, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418. The court also ruled that
(1) fraud and warranty are not viable causes of action where the plaintiff cannot iden-
tify the manufacturer of the product; and (2) a manufacturer's potential liability
under the market share doctrine is several not joint. Id. at 1069-75, 751 P.2d at
483-87, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424-28. The California Court of Appeals also unanimously
upheld Judge Benson's holding. Brown v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 150,
227 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986).
75. 44 Cal. 3d at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. In particular, the
court stated as an example that "it seems unjust to grant the same protection from
liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1067-68, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
78. Id. at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423; see also supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
79. 44 Cal. 3d at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423. "Thus, in one
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Third, the court concluded that unpredictable and inconsistent
judgments involving the same product would inevitably result.80
Therefore, a drug manufacturer would not have a basis to determine
the extent of its liability when deciding whether or not to sell a new
drug. These results, the court noted, could not be harmonized by
appellate courts without threatening the fundamental rule that a trial
court's decision on the facts must be upheld if based on "substantial
evidence."81 The court reasoned further that each case which in-
volves the same drug depends upon the evidence presented and the
judge's subjective perception of whether the three criteria were
met.8 2 Thus, each jurisdiction could be riddled with inconsistent de-
terminations about the same product, which could deter manufactur-
ers from developing and offering new products.83
Fourth, the Brown court ruled out the Kearl approach because of
the danger of inconsistency between the findings of the judge and
jury in the same case.84 This is due to the similarity between the
Kearl and Barker risk/benefit analysis.85 The only difference is that in
Kearl, the judge makes the determination of whether the product is
defectively designed.8 6 Consequently, if the judge decides that the
Kearl criteria have not been met and that the Barker standards should
apply, the jury will be asked to make a second determination, based
on similar factors and evidence, as to whether the drug is defectively
designed. 8
7
The Brown court's rejection of the Feldman, Kearl, and Toner case-
by-case risk/benefit analysis is significant since it implicitly rejected
the idea that a manufacturer can be held liable for a drug's "design,"
regardless of whether in strict liability or negligence.88 The court in
Brown focused on the manufacturer's duty to warn. Specifically, it
held that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for an injury caused
by a properly manufactured drug which was accompanied by an ade-
quate warning to physicians of risks that were known or reasonably,
scientifically knowable at the time of distribution.89 Thus, even
though the court discussed a drug's "design" in terms of strict liabil-
ity, its rejection of risk/benefit criteria as a standard for liability ap-
case the drug that injured the plaintiff might be the better choice, while this would
not be true as to another user." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
83. Brown, at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
84. Id. at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
87. Brown, at 1068, 751 P.2d at 482, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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pears to make a claim for "negligent design" untenable in a
prescription drug case. 90
III. MINNESOTA AND COMMENT K
The Minnesota appellate courts have not had an occasion to de-
cide whether, and in what capacity, to adopt Comment k. The issue
was, however, considered in Minnesota Federal District court by
Judge Robert G. Renner in Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.9l
In Kociemba, the plaintiff had been inserted with a CU-7, which is
an intrauterine contraceptive device produced by G.D. Searle. 92 Af-
ter wearing the device for approximately one and one-half years, the
plaintiff decided to start a family.93 Following an hysterosalp-
ingogram test, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having blocked fallo-
pian tubes-she was infertile.94 After consulting several physicians
who suggested that a pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) caused by
the CU-7 resulted in her infertility, the plaintiff commenced a lawsuit
against the manufacturer.9 5
The plaintiff's complaint contained several counts, but the focus
of this Note is on the first two. In count one, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant negligently designed, tested, manufactured, pro-
90. Id. But see Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 424 n.12, 751 P.2d at 483 n.12, 245 Cal. Rptr.
at 483 n.12. In this footnote, the California Supreme Court explains, "Our conclu-
sion does not mean, of course, that drug manufacturers are free of all liability for
defective drugs. They are subject to liability for manufacturing defects, as well as
under general principles of negligence, and for failure to warn of known or reason-
ably knowable side effects." Id. This statement suggests that, in California, Com-
ment k does not preclude design defect claims based on negligence. However, the
California Supreme Court does not discuss whether Comment k would apply where
strict liability and negligence are merged, as in Minnesota.
91. 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988).
92. Id. at 1295. On February 25, 1974, the FDA notified Searle that the CU-7
had been approved as a prescription drug for sale and distribution in accordance
with Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (1987).
93. Id. at 1296. On June 6, 1977, the plaintiff was inserted with the CU-7 by Dr.
Timothy Scanlan. Twelve days later the plaintiff awoke with severe cramping caused
by an infection. Dr. Scanlan diagnosed the infection as mild endometritis, treated it,
and it disappeared within a month. The plaintiff wore the CU-7 until November
1978, when Dr. Klotter removed the device. Id.
94. Id. After being unable to determine why the Kociemba's were unable to con-
ceive a child, Dr. Klotter referred the plaintiff to Dr. David Lees, a specialist in artifi-
cial insemination. It was on January 18, 1982, that the HSG test was performed
determining Mrs. Kociemba's infertility. Id.
95. Id. at 1297. In April 1982, Dr. Lees referred the plaintiff to Drs. Tagatz and
Nagel at the University of Minnesota Hospitals. It was some two years later, in June
1984, that Dr. Nagel informed Kociemba that her infertility was related to her use of
the CU-7 and PID. On October 1, 1984, the Kociemba's commenced their action.
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moted, labeled, distributed and sold the CU-7, which resulted in pro-
viding an unsafe product to the plaintiff.96 Count two alleged that
the defendant manufactured, sold, promoted, and distributed an un-
reasonably dangerous and defective product and was liable under
the doctrine of strict liability.97
On a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants,
the applicability of Comment k was considered.98 In denying the
motion, Judge Renner predicted that the Minnesota courts would
adopt Comment k if given the opportunity.99 The court stated that,
assuming Comment k was adopted, it would nevertheless not apply
to all prescription drugs as a matter of law (Brown approach), but
only to "some" products (Feldman, Kearl, & Toner approach). Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that material issues of fact existed and that
summary judgment was therefore improper.]00
The court stated further that when the jury is deciding whether a
product is unavoidably unsafe, the following three factors should be
considered:
(i) whether the product could have been designed in a safer
manner;
(ii) whether a safer alternative product could have been available
at that time to accomplish the same intended purpose as the
product in question; and
(iii) whether the benefits of the product outweigh the interest in
promoting enhanced accountability on the part of the
96. Id. "Count One further alleges that the defendant negligently, fraudulently,
and intentionally misrepresented the effects of the CU-7 and failed to adequately
warn physicians of said defects." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1300. Searle maintained that the CU-7, and for that matter, all pre-
scription drugs are "unavoidably unsafe." Thus, it argued that the Comment k pro-
tection should apply to the CU-7 as a matter of law, and that the strict liability count
should be dismissed. Searle further argued that since Minnesota appellate courts
have merged the concepts of negligence and strict liability in product design defect
cases, summary judgment was appropriate for all counts alleging design defects. Id.
99. Id. The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted or ap-
proved several other Comments under section 402A. See id. (citing Farr v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89-91, 179 N.W.2d 64, 69-70 (1970) (comments g, h, i,
and in); Olson v. Village of Babbitt, 291 Minn. 105, 109-111, 189 N.W.2d 701, 705
(1971) (comment 1); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg. Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 38-40, 171 N.W.2d
201, 206 (1969) (comments g, h, i,j); Holm v. Sponco Mfg. Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207,
213 (Minn. 1982) (comment c)).
100. Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1301. The court specifically found that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Searle gave adequate warnings to Dr.
Scanlan, as well as to the medical community-at-large. Id. at 1300-01. In addition,
the court found that, even if the fact finder concludes that Searle provided adequate
warnings on the CU-7, a factual question remains as to whether CU-7 is "unavoidably
unsafe" and therefore subject to Comment k protection. Id. at 1300.
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manufacturer. 0
After two months of trial, and some 4000 exhibits, both sides
rested, at which time the defendants made a motion for a directed
verdict.102 This motion forced the court to reconsider the applicabil-
ity of Comment k. 103 Upon review, Judge Renner reaffirmed his ini-
tial ruling rejecting Brown, but modified significantly the jury
instruction. Specifically, the court recognized that Bilotta had
merged strict liability and negligence in design defect claims.104 The
court concluded that the negligence based standard of Bilotta, as re-
flected in the JIG 117, implicitly contained the policy considerations
underlying Comment k.105 As noted by the court, analysis of the
texts ofJIG 117 and Comment k both require a risk/utility balancing
test to determine the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct
in producing a given product. 106 An important difference between
the tests, however, is that Comment k explicitly provides that a man-
ufacturer may act reasonably in manufacturing an unavoidably un-
safe product while JIG 117 merely implies the same.10 7
Because it found the tests to be essentially the same, the court held
that two separate special verdict questions reflecting the same bal-
ancing test should not be given.108 Thus, the jury received only one
special verdict question on whether the CU-7 was defectively
designed, and received an additional instruction after JIG 117 was
read.109 That instruction reads as follows:
A product prescribed by a physician is not negligently designed
merely because it may have side effects.
Some products, given the present state of human knowledge can-
not be made totally safe for their intended and ordinary use. Be-
cause of the nature of the ingredients or natural characteristics of
the product, their use involves substantial risk of injury, and some
users will necessarily be harmed. Thus, a manufacturer is not neg-
ligent merely because it supplies the public with an apparently use-
ful and desirable product that has a known but apparently
101. Id. (citing Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D. Utah
1987)).
102. See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 432 (D. Minn. 1988).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 434. See also supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text for a full discus-
sion and impact of the merger of the two doctrines.
105. Kociemba, 695 F. Supp. at 434-35.
106. Id. at 435. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text. For a full discussion
of Comment k's language, see supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
107. Kociemba, 695 F. Supp. at 435.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court stated that it adopted a position in which the jury can consider
unavoidable but reasonable risks of a desirable product at the same time it considers
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct. Id.
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By taking this course of action, the court was trying to reduce the
possibility of perverse verdicts."' At the same time, the court was
trying to strike a fair balance between the policy encouraging a man-
ufacturer to produce useful but unavoidably dangerous products and
the policy that holds a manufacturer accountable for unreasonable
conduct. 1 12
In furthering these objectives, the court also concluded that since
the above considerations are best reserved for the fact finder, the
Brown approach would not be applied in Minnesota.113 In addition,
the court rejected the applicability of Brown because California's
"consumer expectation" standard is different from Minnesota's "rea-
sonable care" standard.' 14 Accordingly, in light of Bilotta, the court
declined to adopt Brown because it would eliminate both negligent
and strict liability design defect claims in prescription drug cases, ex-
cept to the extent that a manufacturer is liable for its failure to warn
the user of the inherent dangers of the drug.' 15
IV. ANALYSIS
The legal repercussions resulting from the merger of strict liability
into negligence for design defect claims in Minnesota are un-
resolved. A problematic offshoot from this merger is the Comments
to the now rejected 402A, and more specifically, Comment k.
It is the position of this author, that since the Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that there is little difference between strict liability
and negligence claims for improper design, and in effect has merged
the two theories together, Comment k and its rationale should apply
to the now available cause of action in negligence.' 16 If the court
110. Id.
111. Id. The possibility of perverse verdicts, or inconsistent determinations, was
also a concern for the Brown court in overruling Kearl's mini-trial approach. See supra
text accompanying note 84.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 436.
115. See id.
116. See Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying
Arkansas law). In Hill the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's determination that Arkansas courts would join the majority of jurisdictions
and adopt the defense to strict liability contained in Comment k. The court of ap-
peals, however, reversed the district court on its determination that all prescription
drugs, including the CU-7, fall within the scope of Comment k. Judge Heaney, writ-
ing for the majority, distinguished the Brown case and decided to agree with
Kociemba's rational and held that the unavoidably unsafe product exception should
apply only upon a showing of exceptional social need. Id. In addition, the court held
that Comment k only applies to "some" prescription drugs, not all prescription
drugs, which must be determined on a case by case basis. Id.
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adopted such a position, it would be recognizing that, by definition, a
product which may be "unavoidably unsafe" would be neither "un-
reasonably dangerous" to the consumer (the strict liability standard)
nor would it create an "unreasonable risk of harm" to the consumer
(the negligence standard). Accordingly, Comment k could exclude
"unavoidably unsafe products" as being not defective or unreasona-
bly dangerous.
Assuming, arguendo, that the court would adopt the proposition
that the Comment k exception to strict liability applies to negligence
causes of action, the court should additionally decide whether Com-
ment k applies to prescription drugs as a matter of law, or whether
this is a question of fact, and, if a question of fact, which party has the
burden of proof. In resolving this question, the court will have to
wrestle with whether to adopt the blanket "as a matter of law" ap-
proach as stated in Brown,117 or, whether to fashion some other
mixed question of law and fact approach as in Kociemba.1 18
In choosing between these two alternatives, the supreme court
may decide to fashion a more stringent mixed question of law and
fact approach than Kociemba, while not going quite as far as Brown.' " 9
In adopting such an approach, the court could enable the trial judge
to apply Comment k as a matter of law only after weighing the fol-
lowing considerations: (1) if reasonable minds could not differ in de-
ciding that the drug's benefits exceed its risks, with deference being
given to the FDA's earlier risk/benefit analysis; (2) if there are no
genuine issues of material fact surrounding any fraud or misrepre-
sentation to the FDA regarding the drug's design and safety; and (3)
if the plaintiff's case primarily lies in failure to adequately warn of
risks that were known or reasonably scientifically knowable at the
time of distribution.
Under this approach, the court would not make a negligent design
defect claim for prescription drugs totally baseless in Minnesota, but
would allow the trial judge more flexibility and at the same time bal-
ance the competing interests of plaintiffs and manufacturers. For in-
stance, if the trial judge were to find that an application of the
risk/benefit analysis allows reasonable minds to differ despite the
FDA approval, then the issue should go to the jury. Similarly, if
there was evidence and material fact questions regarding fraud and
misrepresentation to the FDA, or if in fact the alleged defect may
117. See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
118. See Kociemba, 695 F. Supp. at 433.
119. See Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island adopted a mixed question of law and fact ap-
proach similar to Kociemba, but less stringent than the one proposed, and couched in
strict liability terms. See id.
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have been avoidable, then the judge should submit the issue to the
trier of fact.
By allowing this flexibility, the burden of proof would shift to the
"superior knowledge" of the defendants, and require them to show
that the benefits outweighed the risks at the time the product was
prescribed; that there are no material questions of fact regarding
fraud or misrepresentation; and that the alleged defect was in fact
unavoidable given the scientific knowledge and testing at the time
the product was approved.
As is evident from the above discussion, there certainly is some
practical merit in conferring immunity through Comment k to design
defect claims for all prescription drugs as stated in Brown. Neverthe-
less, the literal interpretation of Comment k applies only to "some"
products, and in light of the merger of strict liability and negligence,
the mixed question of law and fact approach would be a realistic al-
ternative given the differences of Minnesota and California product
liability law. 120
CONCLUSION
Prescription drugs today are the most heavily regulated consumer
products in our society.121 Vaccine research, an area in which the
United States was once a leader, has slowed to a trickle.122 We can-
not permit liability doctrines to slow drug development, cause enor-
mous price increases, and inevitably drive beneficial products off the
market. As stated by one major pharmaceutical president, "Who in
his right mind would work on a product today that would be used by
pregnant women?" 1 23 We cannot tolerate this reality, we need to
encourage, not stifle drug manufacturers from developing lifesaving,
disease preventing, and illness curing drugs.
How to simultaneously protect the interests of society, the drug
industry, and the innocent victims of certified drugs on the market, is
one of the most difficult problems facing our tort system today. As a
state we should be a leader in curtailing the liability crisis that has
and will deprive the public of safe, effective products that help make
life easier, healthier and longer.
Inevitably there will be many more prescription drug related cases
in the years to come. Based upon the foregoing analysis, it seems
clear that this issue is ripe for consideration in Minnesota, and may
120. For a complete discussion of the differences between Minnesota and Califor-
nia design defect law, see Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1987).
121. Crout, The Drug Regulatory System: Reflections and Predictions, 36 FOOD DRUG
CosM. LJ. 106, 113 (1981).
122. P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 156
(1988).
123. Id. at 155.
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be a candidate for accelerated review or certification to resolve expe-
ditiously this important social and legal dilemma.
Patrick H. O'Neill, Jr.
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